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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 19-1308 
________________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
KABONI SAVAGE, ALSO KNOWN AS YUSEF BILLA, 
ALSO KNOWN AS JOSEPH AMILL, AGENT BONNIE, 
BON, B, 
 
             Appellant 
________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-04-cr-00269-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Mark A. Kearney  
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)  
October 1, 2019 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, FUENTES, and FISHER, Circuit 
Judges  
 
(Opinion filed:  March 31, 2020) 
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge 
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Appellant, Kaboni Savage, was convicted of drug 
offenses, money laundering, and witness tampering in 2005. 
For those crimes, he was sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment, 
a special assessment of $1,400, and a fine of $5,000. The fine 
has been periodically collected from Savage’s prison trust 
account by the Federal Bureau of Prisons under the Inmate 
Financial Responsibility Program. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3572(d)(3), Savage asked the District Court to modify his 
judgment and provide that installment payments be made 
directly to the court on a fixed schedule, based on a material 
change in his economic circumstances. The issue before us is 
whether the District Court properly denied Savage’s motion to 
modify his fine payment schedule for a lack of jurisdiction 
under § 3572(d)(3).  For the reasons that follow, we conclude 
that the District Court properly denied Savage’s request based 
on a lack of jurisdiction. 
 
I.  
At Savage’s sentencing hearing for his 2005 
convictions, the sentencing judge stated that the $5,000 fine 
was “due immediately,” but “recommended” that the 
defendant participate in the Bureau of Prisons Inmate Financial 
Responsibility Program.1  Under the Inmate Financial 
 
1 A64-65.  Although the written Judgment states “[f]ine is to 
be paid through the federal Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate 
Financial Responsibility Program due during imprisonment,” 
A31, the sentencing transcript clarifies that the judge 
specifically ordered the fine “due immediately” and merely 
“recommended” participation in the Inmate Financial 
Responsibility Program, A64-65.  See United States v. Faulks, 
201 F.3d 208, 211 (3d Cir. 2000) (“A long line of cases 
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Responsibility Program, the Bureau periodically takes money 
from an inmate’s prison trust account for the payment of fines, 
restitution, or other financial obligations, and forwards it to the 
Court on the inmate’s behalf. Additionally, the Court stated 
“[i]n the event the fine is not paid prior to the commencement 
of [supervised release], the defendant shall satisfy the amount 
due in monthly installments of not less than $100 . . . .”2   
Savage’s probation officer advised that Savage would 
be able to contribute half of his monthly prison work earnings 
toward any fine that might be imposed. However, after 
Savage’s sentencing, his conditions of confinement changed.  
Specifically, after Savage was charged with directing several 
killings from the Federal Detention Center of Philadelphia, he 
was transferred to a federal super-maximum-security prison in 
Florence, Colorado.3  At the maximum-security prison, Savage 
is not permitted to work and earn money. Thus, Savage claims 
that the restrictions placed on him in the maximum-security 
prison have created obstacles to his ability to pay his fine and 
purchase stamps and supplies needed to correspond with 
counsel in his ongoing capital appeal. 
In connection with his claims, Savage filed a motion in 
the District Court to modify the payment schedule of his 
$5,000 fine, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)(3).  Section 
3572(d)(3) provides that a court can modify a judgment which 
“permits payments in installments” based on a “material 
 
provides that when the two sentences are in conflict, the oral 
pronouncement prevails over the written judgment.”). 
2 A65. 
3 Savage was convicted of these murders, among other crimes, 
in a separate case in 2013.  As a result of that conviction, 
Savage was sentenced to death on 13 capital counts.  The case 
is currently on direct appeal before this Court (No. 14-9003).   
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change in the defendant’s economic circumstances.” The 
District Court denied Savage’s motion, concluding that it 
lacked jurisdiction to modify the Bureau of Prisons’ payment 
schedule because the fine was “due immediately” and “no 
court-ordered payment schedule currently governs [Savage’s] 
payment of his criminal fine.”4  Therefore, the District Court 
held that the sentencing judgment imposing the fine was not 
modifiable under § 3572(d)(3). 
Savage subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration, 
which was also denied by the District Court.  However, the 
District Court relied on a different rationale in denying 
Savage’s motion for reconsideration.  Specifically, the District 
Court put aside the question of whether Savage’s sentencing 
order “permit[ted] payments in installments” and, instead, 
concluded that Savage’s motion is beyond the scope of § 
3572(d)(3) because challenges to the Inmate Financial 
Responsibility Program collection mechanism concern the 
execution of a sentence and, thus, are properly framed as 
habeas challenges under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.5  The issue of 
whether the District Court had jurisdiction to grant Savage’s 
requested relief under § 3572(d)(3) is now before us on 
appeal.6    
II.  
 
4 See A4. 
5 A6. 
6 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
Savage’s prosecution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  This Court 
has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 
and this appeal presents a pure question of law over which this 
Court exercises plenary review.  T-Mobile Ne. LLC v. City of 
Wilmington, 913 F.3d 311, 318 n.5 (3d Cir. 2019).   
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Savage argues that (A) Third Circuit case law supports 
his position that a judgment recommending the scheduling of 
payments through the Inmate Financial Responsibility 
Program is modifiable under § 3572(d)(3) as an order 
“permit[ting] payments in installments,” and (B) the District 
Court mischaracterized his request when it ruled that he was 
challenging the Bureau of Prisons’ collection mechanism, and 
thus, that his challenge must be brought as a habeas petition.  
We address each argument in turn.   
 
A. 
Section 3572(d)(3) states:  
A judgment for a fine which permits payments in 
installments shall include a requirement that the 
defendant will notify the court of any material 
change in the defendant’s economic 
circumstances that might affect the defendant’s 
ability to pay the fine. Upon receipt of such 
notice the court may, on its own motion or the 
motion of any party, adjust the payment 
schedule, or require immediate payment in full, 
as the interests of justice require.7 
 
The critical question here is whether the District Court’s 
sentencing order permitted payment in installments when it 
ordered the fine “due immediately” and recommended that the 
Bureau of Prisons collect the fine through its Inmate Financial 
Responsibility Program.   
 
7 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)(3) (emphasis added). 
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 Savage cannot move for a modification of payment 
under § 3572(d)(3) because the sentencing court never 
permitted payment in installments.  Instead, the court required 
immediate payment.  The sentencing court stated that “[t]he 
fine is due immediately,”8 and thus never “provide[d] for 
payment . . . in installments.”9  Section 3572(d)(3) by its plain 
language does not apply where the fine is due immediately.  
While the sentencing court “recommended” that Savage 
“participate in” the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program,10 
nothing in § 3572(d)’s language precludes the Bureau of 
Prisons under its Inmate Financial Responsibility Program 
regulations from setting a payment schedule to satisfy a fine 
that was due to be paid immediately.  Accordingly, the 
sentencing court’s recommendation that Savage participate in 
the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program did not transform 
his fine payable immediately into one subject to installments.11  
Put simply the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program 
provides a means to make good faith payments but is not an 
installment order.12  As a result, § 3572(d)(3) does not apply to 
 
8 A64. 
9 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)(1). 
10 A64–65. 
11 See United States v. Ellis, 522 F.3d 737, 738 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(“If a fine is ordered payable immediately, ‘immediate 
payment’ does not mean ‘immediate payment in full;’ rather it 
means ‘payment to the extent that the defendant can make it in 
good faith, beginning immediately.’” (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted)). 
12 Id. at 738–39 (concluding that “a payment schedule 
established by the [Bureau of Prisons] does not conflict with 
[a] sentencing court’s immediate payment order” because “the 
court has no equivalent responsibility [to set a payment 
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Savage, and the District Court properly denied his motion 
brought pursuant to that section. 
Moreover, although the sentencing judge in this case 
recommended that the Bureau of Prisons enroll Savage in the 
Inmate Financial Responsibility Program, she did not direct the 
Bureau to take such action or implicitly delegate any statutorily 
prescribed authority.  Instead, she explicitly used her authority 
to order that Savage’s fine be paid immediately.  Furthermore, 
interpreting the sentencing order as one “permit[ing] payments 
in installments” under § 3572(d)(3) would not only go against 
the specific language used at sentencing, it would also mean 
that the sentencing judge failed to comply with § 3572(d)(2) 
by inappropriately delegating her authority to set a payment 
schedule.13  For those reasons, Savage’s argument that the 
 
schedule] when it orders a fine payable immediately” (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
13 Compare United States v. Foote, 413 F.3d 1240, 1253 (10th 
Cir. 2005) (holding that the district court erred in delegating 
the creation of a payment schedule to the probation office 
because “[w]hen a district court provides that a criminal fine 
be paid in installments, 18 U.S.C. § 3572 requires the court to 
specify the period of time over which the payments must be 
made”); United States v. Workman, 110 F.3d 915, 919 (2d Cir. 
1997) (vacating a sentence requiring the Bureau of Prisons to 
fix a schedule for a defendant’s fine payments because “§ 
3572(d) does not allow courts to delegate the scheduling of 
installment payments for fines”); United States v. Miller, 77 
F.3d 71, 77-78 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that “a district court 
may not delegate its authority to set the amount and timing of 
fine payments to the Bureau of Prisons or the probation 
officer”).  In each of these cases courts held that a sentencing 
court impermissibly delegated its authority where that court 
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sentencing order permitted “payments in installments” is 
unpersuasive. 
Savage’s reliance on United States v. Wynn14 does not 
change the outcome.  As a non-precedential opinion, Wynn 
does not bind our Court.  In spite of that limitation, Savage 
points to dicta in Wynn stating that although a district court 
may have ordered a fine to be paid immediately, “an informal 
understanding that the [Bureau of Prisons] would set a payment 
schedule” could call into question whether the district court 
simply delegated setting a payment schedule, thus permitting 
payments in installments.15  Notably, such a delegation is 
proscribed by § 3572(d)(2).  That is not the issue that we 
decided in Wynn, however, and Savage’s reliance on this case 
is misplaced.16   
Because Savage’s fine was ordered “due immediately,” 
and no court-ordered payment schedule currently exists, we 
conclude that the District Court did not have jurisdiction over 
Savage’s motion to modify under § 3572(d)(3). 
 
 
ordered the defendant to pay the fine in installments and then 
delegated the task of establishing installment payment 
schedules to a probation officer or the Bureau of Prisons. 
14 328 F. App’x 826 (3d Cir. 2009). 
15 Id. at 828.  
16 In Wynn, we determined that if Wynn’s “true aim” in filing 
his motion was to object to “the manner in which the [Bureau 
of Prisons] is encouraging him to pay the money he owes” his 
complaint is beyond the scope of § 3572(d)(3) and would 
properly be framed as a habeas petition.  328 F. App’x at 829.  
On that basis, the case was remanded to the District Court 
without determining whether Wynn’s sentence permitted 
payments in installments or constituted a delegation.   
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B. 
Next, Savage argues that the District Court 
mischaracterized his request when it ruled that he was 
challenging the method and means of collecting his fine and 
such a challenge must be brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in 
the jurisdiction of his confinement.   
Savage claims that he is not challenging the Bureau of 
Prisons’ collection mechanism, but instead is asking the Court 
to remove the collection process from the Bureau of Prisons’ 
control altogether.  Specifically, Savage’s motion asked the 
Court to modify the judgment by adjusting the payment 
schedule, from one delegated to the Bureau of Prisons to one 
set by the court, with fixed payments to be made directly to the 
court. 
However, even if we were to accept Savage’s argument 
that he is not challenging the Bureau of Prisons’ collection 
mechanism, his sentencing judgment cannot be modified by 
the District Court under § 3572(d)(3) for the reasons discussed 
supra in Section II(A).  As a result, the District Court lacks 
jurisdiction to grant Savage’s motion to modify.    
However, as discussed by the District Court, after 
exhausting his administrative remedies, Savage may object to 
the Bureau of Prisons’ collection mechanism for his fine and 
seek an alternate payment schedule from the Bureau by filing 
a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the district where he is 
incarcerated. 
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III.  
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of 
the District Court denying Savage’s motion to modify the 
District Court’s fine and schedule for fines. 
